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ABSTRACT
Weshow, in a reasonably general model, that if a highly indebted
country has good investment projects available to it, then it will notbenefit
from using any of its resources to buy back debt at market prices. Debt
buybacks and debt-equity swaps only make sense for the country if these
programs are heavily subsidized by creditors. Thisresult holds for all buyback
programs large and small, so long as theyinvolve voluntary creditor
participation and are not part of a larger deal including offsetting concessions
from lenders.
Our analysis therefore casts doubt on the popular argument that
unilateral debt repurchases benefit HICs by relieving "debt overhang'.
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I. Introduction
Investment in highly indebted countries (HICs) has fallen dramatically in this decade,
from 25.2 percent of gross domestic product in 1980 to 17.2 percent in 1984, rebounding
only to 19.6 percent in 1987.
1Overthe same period, net capital flows have sharply reversed
so that most HICs are now making interest payments in excess of new borrowing. Given
their failure to grow over the past decade, there is now a widespread view that the HICs
will never pay their debts in full; HIC bank loans trade in the secondary market at large
discounts to par. 2
Recently,many countries have tried to alleviate their debt burdens either by repur-
chasing part of their debt at discount or by engaging in debt-equity swaps. Mexico, Chile,
and Bolivia have already conducted debt repurchases, and Costa Rica is considering one.
Debt-equity swaps have been tried to varying degrees by most of the major debtor coun-
tries. In a debt-equity swap, a foreign investor purchases debt on the secondary market and
swaps it with the debtor country in exchange for direct foreign investment (that is,physical
investment in the debtor country). Using swaps, Brazil may have cut its $120 billion foreign
debt by as much as $6 billion in 1988 alone. Chile has retired $4.2 billion through swaps
and other mechanisms since the end of 1984, reducing its bank debt outstanding by more
than 36 percent. From the debtor country's point of view, debt-equity swaps differ from
See World Development Report, 1988, p. 190. The IMF's and World Bank's list of
highly indebted third world countries (major problem debtors) includes Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d' Noire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Phillipines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Of the seventeen,all but
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Yugoslavia invested a lower fraction of GNP in 1980-86 than
in 1973-80.
2Secondarytrading in government-guaranteed HIC debt held by private Western banks
now equals about $15 biffion per year and may soon double that. See, for example,Hobart
Rowen,"Wall St. Takes on Debt Crisis -AndProspers", Washington Post, May 8, 1988, p
Hi.
See World Bank World DebtTables,1988-89 ed., Volume 1, p. 23; Peter Truell, "Banks,
Latin American Nations Are Fed Up With Debt: New Methods Have Been Found to Reduce
the Burden of Shaky Loans", Wall Street Journal, September 22, 1988; Alan Riding, "Debt-
Equity Swaps Draw Latin Criticisms", New York Times, January 2, 1989; and ClydeH.
Farnsworth, "Banks Ask for Backing For Third World Loans", New York Times, January
12, 1989.
1conventional direct foreign investment (DFI) only in that the country receives some of its
own bonds instead of foreign exchange for the DFI. Therefore, a debt-equity swap is really
a combination of conventional DPI and a debt buyback.
Among the many experts who favor buybacks, some argue that repurchases can benefit
both debtors and creditors. They contend that the "overhang" of existing debt discourages
new investment because creditors will skim off part of the returns.If countries and their
creditors are unable to devise mechanisms to get around this problem, then countries face a
wedge between private and social returns to investment. Allowing the debtor to repurchase
debt at a discount, so the theory goes, would increase investment incentives and provide
efficiency gains to both debtors and creditors.5
We do not propose to debate the existence of debt overhang; throughout most of our
analysis we will assume that a HIC has unused investment opportunities which have zero
or positive net present value (NPV). Our point is that under fairly general assumptions a
country with profitable investment opportunities never benefits by devoting any of its re-
sources to a voluntary buyback scheme, unless the buyback is part of a larger deal including
concessions from creditors. Simply put, if a country is considering spending x dollars on
buybacks in order to spur investment by y dollars, it will be better off devoting the entire
x plus y to investment.6
Our result generally holds even if foreign creditors can extract most or even all of the
returns from any new investment, whenever the country fails to repay its debt in full. The
point is that there is also a "tax" on buybacks since the marginal debt the country retires is
worth less than the average debt price it must pay. The problem with buybacks is that they
See, for example, Steven Greenhouse, "New Coal: 3d World Debt Reduction", New
York Times, October 4, 1988, p.C1. "In impassioned speeches [at the 1988 annual meeting
of the IMP] in West Berlin, officials from ....developing nations said all the money they
devoted to debt service had crippled consumption and investment. That, they say, has
starved economic growth and caused per capita income to laM in Africa and Latin America
since 1982."
Krugman (1989) argues that buybacks at market prices would generally benefit coun-
tries at the expense of their creditors, even if there is no inefficiency in investment. Froot
(1989) provides a technical analysis of debt reduction in the presence of "debt overhang",
assuming like Krugman that creditors can take a country's entire investment income if it
defaults on its debts. Sachs and Huizinga (1987) are among the many other advocates of
the debt overhang theory, and they support a wide variety of debt reduction schemes as
means of encouraging greater investment.
6Andmaybe better off still if it divides the r plus y between investment and consumption.
2generally raise the value of any remaining debt outstanding, since there are less creditors
left to split any repayments when the country partially defaults. This increase in expected
future repayments to creditors who did not participate in the buyback effectively constitutes
a "buyback tax" that is almost always larger than the "investment tax". If, in addition,
investment yields higher social returns than a buyback, as the debt overhang theoryiinplies,
then the case for preferring investment to buybacks only becomes stronger.
II. A Model of the Buyback Problem
A. Timing
We model the buyback problem as part of a five stage, complete information process.
In the first stage the country "inherits" a stock of debt, D. In the second stage the country
chooses the amount of its reserves to devote to a debt buyback.8 After the buyback, in stage
three, the country chooses its level of investment. In stage four uncertainty is resolved,
determining gross investment income. Finally, in stage five, the country makes payments
on its debt and consumes the remainder of its gross investment income plus any resources it
did not allocate to either investments or buybacks. Figure 1 outlines the timing of events.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
One may think of stages (2) and (3) occurring almost simultaneously, some time pass-
ing, and then stages (4) and (5) occurring almost simultaneously.
B. Definitions and Assumptions
1. Production Technology
The country has a production function y(I, 9), where y is output, I is total investment,
and 9 is a stochastic disturbance; 9 c [,7], with density function 1(9), and cumulative
density function F(9). We assume that > 0 and that yi(O,9) =cc9All borrowers
Any negotiated restructuring of the country's debt occurs at stage one, prior to the
start of the "game". Our concern here is to analyze the efficacy of unilateral buybacks;
therefore we treat D as given. For interesting analyses of debt restructurings, see Krugman
(1989), Froot (1989), or Helpman (1988).
8 International lending contracts typically contain certain clauses prohibiting the country
from repurchasing its debt, because such repurchases technically violate the clause that all
lenders must be treated equally. However, for reasons that will become apparent, lenders
are often quite happy to waive these clauses.
This Inada condition is imposed for simplicity and is not necessary for our results. A
weaker assumption that would also achieve the same simplification is that yi(O, 9) =oofor

































































































































































 and lenders are assumed to be risk neutral, an assumption to be discussed in detail in
section VI. For simplicity, the riskless interest rate is assumed to be zero.10
2. Enforcement Technology
Once investment returns are realized (i.e., after stage four), creditors are able to extract
repayments equal to the minimum of the face value of the debt and an amount c(I,9,C),
where C is the amount devoted directly to consumption (that is, allocated neither to invest-
ment nor buybacks). We assume that 0 <"i < yj,O <u<Y2,and 0 ￿ C. That is, when
the country's investment income rises by a. dollar, whether through higher investment or
through good luck, creditors will be able to extract some, but not all, of that extra income,
unless the country is already repaying its debt in full.'1
The parameters of thea function are likely to assume quite different values for sovereign
and corporate debt. For a corporation yj =Cland Y2= (72:every extra dollar earned by a
company provides (approximately) one dollar more for its creditors in the event of default.
In the country case, an extra dollar of income benefits creditors by only a small fraction of
that amount. However, we allow for the "corporate case" as a limiting special case of our
analysis.
3. Buybcck Costs and Debt Valuation
At stage two, the country will be able to repurchase B(J,C, X; D) of face value claims
for an expenditure of X where X .cBif the country's debt sells at a discount. Note that
investors will be selling their debt after X is chosen but before stage three when the country
allocates resources between I and C. However, as we will show, they will be able to deduce
what the country will spend on I and C once X and B are detennined.
10 This assumption is completely innocuous —onecould alternatively consider all financial
variables to be written as present values discounted to the same time.
Income devoted directly to consumption may or may not be immune from creditors;
if for example the country wishes to consume imports that can be seized or otherwise
impeded by creditors then a may be positive. The rationale underlying the enforcement
technoIo' assumed here is based on the theoretical and empirical arguments presented
in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a,b). Although foreign creditors cannot realistically invade a
defaulting country and sieze its productive assets, they can hinder its trade in world goods
and capital markets. Bulow and Rogoff(1989a) investigate the resulting dynamic bargaining
game between debtors and creditors. To simplify the analysis here, we haveboiled down
the entire future into a single period. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) we show that LDC debt
contracts must be primarily supported by the legal and political rights of creditors within
their own countries, rather than by reputational factors.
5At the end of stage two, once the buyback is completed, the market value of remaining
debt is just the expected future payments to bondholders:
V(I,C,X;D) E{minlD —B(I,C,X;D),c(I,9,C)]} (1)
We can rewrite V(I,C,X;D) as
'4





That is, given I,C,X, and D, Oisthe critical value of 0 such that the country will pay its
debt in full if and only if 0 ￿ U.Givenour assumptions, Uisdecreasing in C, I, and X and
increasing in D.
To economize on notation, we will adopt the following conventions: B(X)debt
repurchased for an expenditure of X; V(D —B)Emarketvalue of remaining debt after
repurchase of B(X) face value of bonds.
C.EquilibriumCondition forBuybacks





—B(X)1is the market price of the country's debt after the repurchase.
Condition (4) simply states that the marginal investor must be indifferent between tendering
and not tendering his bonds.
D. Marginal vs. Average Debt
Two important concepts that will play a recurring role in our analysis are marginal
and average debt. Marginal debt is defined as OV(D —B)/5(D
—B).It is the cost to the




12 The reason we are centrally concerned with and not with will
become apparent after we prove proposition 1 below. The two can be different because a
6The average value of debt is the total value of debt divided by the amount outstanding. If
all debt is treated pan passu (equal sharing), as virtually all sovereign loans are, then the
average value is simply the market price of abond.13 Again using equation (4) we find the
average value of debt, tobe always at least as large as the marginal value:
=
D — 11(X)f a(I, 9, C)f(9)dO+ 1—F(O) (6)
Figure 2 illustrates the difference between marginal and average debt.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
In the Figure, drawn for given I, C, and X, the market value of debt is found by taking
the returns to debtholders for each value of 9 and weighting those returns by the density
of that value. This is done by graphing realized returns against the cumulative density
function of 9 so that each range of values of 9 for which there is, say, a .01 probability
of realization, is allocated a width of .01 on the horizontal aids. The total valueof debt,
integrating across all states, is the sum of area i, representing the market value of a claim
to creditors' income in defaulting states, and area ii, which represents the market value of
a claim to creditors' income in full payment states. The average value of debt is just the
total value divided by the face value D —11(X).
The marginal value of debt, which is the increment to total value if D —11(X)is
increased by one dollar, is 1 —F(ö).This equals the area of rectangle ii, which has area
[1 —F(O)].tD
—11(X)],divided by D —11(X).Therefore, the ratio of the marginal value
of debt to the average value is
Marginal Value of Debt—ii—valueof returns in full payment states




valueof returns in all states
This ratio will turn out to be of critical importance in our comparison of investment
and buybacks.
higher face value of debt could discourage investment. In the extreme, d—) could be
negative; this would be the case if we were on the wrong side of the infamous Debt Laffer
Curve (see, for example, Krugman (1989)). The difference betweenthe country's gain from
a one dollar reduction in the face value of its debt,OV(D—B) and. the bondholder's loss,
ddV(,f_BB)) ,is attributable to the efficiency consequences of changes in the country's allocation
of resources.
13 If some bonds receive priority over others then obviously the senior bonds will sell for





AVERAGE vs MARGINAL DEBT
(I, C, X held constant)
F(O)
DARK LINE REPRESENTS MIN (D-B(X), a(O))
1. Total Market Value of Debt = area I + area II
2. Average Value of Debt =
3. MargInal Value of Debt =
Total Market Value of Debt
D- B(X)











4. MargInal Value of Debt— ____
Average Value of Debt
—
I + II
8III. The Country's Optimization Problem
The country wishes to maximize its expected consumption
W(I,C,X; D) C + E{y(I, 9)) —V(I,C,X; D) (8)
subject to
C+I+X=W0 (9)
9W OW=0if C>0 (10)
C,I,X￿0 (11)
Equation (8) states that expected consumption equals resources devoted directly to
consumption, C, plus expected gross investment returns, E{y(I, 9)}, less expected bond
repayments V. Equation (9) is the country's budget constraint, and equation (10) is a
perfection constraint.14 It says that after the bayback the country will split remaining
resources between C and I to maximize W. The perfection constraint prevents the country
from buying back its debt at a cheaper price by announcing that it is going to choose a very
low level of investment; such an announcement is not credible.15
We define a solution to (8) as 1, X, C. Since we are interested in when buybacks
can be optimal, we concentrate on characterizing this solution when X > 0.





PROOF:Assume X > 0.
Implicitly differentiating (8) yields
dW OW 9WOC owo.r
(12) 'Technically,constraint (10) would read =ifI,C > 0; ￿ ?!S13'i f C =0; f￿ if I =0.However, it simplifies to (10) because the Inada condition guarantees
that I> 0.
If the country can precommit to an investment level, negotiations between creditors
and debtors should yield efficient investment and eliminate debt overhang. In this case,
the financial structure of the country does not affect its real decisions, as in the standard
Miller-Modigliani world. See, for example, Fama and Miller (1972).
9Applying the perfection constraint (10) implies
o_+0w10('+1)1 (13) OX 1T(. OX j
¼






This proof shows that if buybacks are profitable then, in equilibrium, an extradollar
spent on buybacks has the same benefit to the country as adollar's worth of extra invest-
ment. Buybacks that are unprofitable on their own cannot be madeviable by their effects
on the country's investment incentives.
IV. Analysis of Buybacks: A.Special Case
Armed with proposition 1, we can readily determine whether, for any given production
and enforcement technology, buybacks can be profitable. Before proceeding to a general




0 ￿ q <1,0 ￿ q C1-
Toeconomize on notation, we also assume 0 and normalize so that E(O) =
f91(o)de=1.
Under the investment technology of (14), the country's relative returns on investment
in different states of nature are unaffected by the level of investment. Roughly speaking, the
returns on marginal investment are taken to share the same risk characteristics as returns
on other investment. With the linear expropriation technology, 9 can becalculated from
equation (3) to be U= [D—B(X)
—qjC]/[q3g(1)j.Figure 3 illustrates these assumptions.





































































































































 In Figure 3, at investment level I, the value of bondholders' claims isthe sum of areas
i + ii + iii + iv. When investment is increased from I to I', returns in all risky states are
increased proportionately. Therefore, the ratio of area vi+ vii to iii is the same asthe ratio
of viii to iv + v. The value of bondholders' claims would rise to i + ii + iii + iv +vi.
Note that Oy/l a g'(l) is the expected present value of returns from a marginal
investment, since E(9) =I.Therefore, marginal investment has a positive net present
value if and only if g'(I)> 1.
Proposition 2 below states that if a country has any unused non-negativenet present
value ir.vestment, then it will not benefit from devoting ny of its resources to buybacks.
PROPOSITION 2: 11 g'(I) ￿ 1, then X =0.
PROOF: See Appendix.
A diagramatic exposition of propostion 2 follows. Consider the best case for buybacks,
where the investment alternative has zero NPV. Then there are no efficiency consequences
of increasing or decreasing buyback levels and the gain to the country of spending another
dollar on buybacks is exactly equal to the change in expected payments to bondholders.
First consider an extra dollar found and spent on a buyback. In Figure 4 bondholders
own a claim worth areas i + iii + ii + iv. An expenditure of one dollar on a buybackwill
induce an individual bondholder to relinquish a claim equal to the entire shaded area in
Figure 4: This area represents his share of total payoffs in both defaulting statesand non-
defaulting states, and must equal one dollar. flowever, the benefit to the country is only
the black part of the shaded area. The problem is that an individual bondholder has no
incentive to recognize that when he relinquishes his debt, other creditors benefit whenever
9 cO. Indefaulting states, the buyback only helps other bondholders by allowingthem
to split the same default pie among less creditors. Since the total shaded area is in direct
proportion to i + iii + ii + iv and the black shaded area is in proportion to ii + iv, the gain
to the country from a dollar's increase in buybacks is 1+1t7÷10or,by equation (7), the
ratio of the value of marginal to the value of average debt.

























































































 Now consider a marginal investment in the case where q =1;that is, where 100
percent of investment returns can be seized in the event of a default. This is, of course,
the leastfavorablecase for investment relative to buybacks. lithe marginal investment
has a zero net present value, then the entire shaded area in Figure 5 is one dollar. The
proportion of that dollar going to tile country is > > +t4.so
the country keeps more from investment than from a buyback even if q =1.11 q C1,
the country keeps 1— q off the top and of the remaining q.Itgets even more if
g' >1.Therefore, the country is always better off reducing baybacks. While creditors do
collect a "tax" on the country's marginal investment, as in the debt overhang theory, the
debt overhang "tax rate" is always lowerthanthe implicit tax on buybacks.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
V. The General Case
While section IV indicates that buybacks will never be profitable under certain as-
sumptions, it is possible by looking at the general case to derive conditions under which
these repurchases would make sense. However, we will argue at the end of this section that
these conditions are quite unrealistic.
For buybacks to be profitable, we must have OW/OX ￿ OW/LU at the optimum. It is
straightforward to show that even in the general case OW/OX￿ aueag:ua1ueofdebtThe
proof is exactly that given in the appendix, which only makes use of the special investment
technology in section IV to calculate OW/Ol.
The general formula for OW/Ol is
=J vi(IO)f&)dG
—J cj(I,9,C)f(9)dO (16)
which can be interpreted as the expected marginal return on investment less the expected





















whereis the fraction of incremental defaulting state returns that go to bondholders, and
G(Ô) is the fraction of returns to marginal investment earned in defaulting states. Then,
using (17) and (18), (16) can be rewritten as
7W -
= E(yi){1—G(9).] (19)
For buybacks to be a good idea, (19) must be less than or equal to the ratio of marginal
valueofdebt to average value of debt, which by equations (5) and (6) is given by
marginal value of debt—
1 —F(Ô) > 2O




We can place a lower bound on OW/Olbysetting E(yi) =1and G(ö)=1in equation
(16). E(y1) =1implies that the country only has a zero NPV project available. If debt
overhang really depresses investment to inefficiently low levels, then E(yj) >1.G(O) =1
implies that all marginal investment returns are earned in defaulting states, and that invest-
ment yields nothing when the country does well enough to not default. Setting E(yj) =1
and G(Ü) =1we find, by comparing (19) and (20), that buybacks are at least as good for




Furthermore, under the more reasonable assumption that there exist zero NPV marginal
investments that have at least as high an average return in good (i.e. non-defaulting) states
of nature as in defaulting states —holdingU.S. Treasury bills would be an example of such
an investment opportunity —thenG(ê) F(Ô)and(21) becomes
1mar gina value of debt
—
—
averagevahse of debt (22) —1 —marginal value of debt
The empirical implausibility of(21) and (22) can be easily demonstrated. The seventeen
HICs listed in the World Bank tables of troubled debtors (see footnote 1) owe less than four
16TABLE 1
DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF FUTURE NET INCOME
Country Private Debt,Private Debt,Market Value of Debt
Book Value Market ValueAs Percent of Present
12/31/87 12/31/87 Value of Future Income
(S millIons)(3 mIllions) 12/31/87
Argentina 40,327 13,950 1.21%
Bolivia 1.083 153 0.25%
Brazil 66,452 31,763 0.67%
Chile 11,579 7,186 2.80%
Colombia 5,566 3,857 0.76%
Costa Rica 1,631 253 0.41%
Cote D'lvoire 3,720 1,593 1.13%
Ecuador 5,866 2,394 1.64%
Jamaica 575 295 0.78%
Mexico 66,831 33,548 1.61%
Morocco 4,916 2,666 1.14%
Nigeria 14,091 5,949 1.69%
Peru 6,083 860 0.13%
Phlllipines 11,884 6.230 1.20%
Uruguay 2,398 1,422 1.30%
Venezuela 24,116 13,952 2.41%
Yugoslavia 7,605 3,726 0.41%
17 KICs 274,723 129,797 1.03%
Source: World Debt Tables, 1988-89 edition; Salomon Brothers.
Private Debt is debt owed to private creditors.
Country is assumed to need to invest 25 percent of GNP each year to maintain
a growth rate S points below the discount rate on its future income.
Supplier debt is assumed to be worth the minimum of 100
cents on the dollar and five times the value of financial market debt.
17months' GNP to their commercial bank creditors. Since the market value of this debt is
well under hail of lace value, the expected present value of future repayments is less than
two months' income. The implication is that 4, which is a measure of the fraction of a
country's income that can be seized for debt repayment, is very small —atthe very most
.05.16
Anotherpespective on the size of4is given in Table 1. The table shows that for 17 HICs
debt represents an average of approximately one percent of future income, even assuming
that the country's growth rate will be five percentage points below its risk-adjusted discount
rate and deducting 25 percent of CNP each year for investment to maintain this modest
growth. (We do not mean to imply by these calculations that HICs' debt is not quite
burdensome, only that q is low).
[Insert Table 1 Herel
Table 1 only includes private debt and not debt to official creditors, because we regard
debt to official creditors as more of a measure of the present value of past foreign aid than
of future repayments. As table 2 shows, except in unusual circumstances (such as in 1987
when Brazil was punished lot its debt moratorium and the United States was delaying
approval of increased World Bank "lending"), private lenders have accounted for well over
100 percent of HICs' net repayment burden.
[Insert Table 2 Herej
However, even if were as high as .25, (21) and (22) can only hold if the value of
marginal debt is very close to the value of average debt. For example, (21) implies that if
4 =.25and a country's debt is selling for 50 cents on the dollar then there must be at least
a 37.5 percent chance of full repayment and at most an expected repayment of 20 cents on
the dollar conditional on default. For (22) to hold, the probability of full repayment would
have to rise to 42.9 percent and the expected payments in defaulting states could be at most
12.5 percent of par. This essentially "all or nothing" distribution of expected repayments
seems inconsistent with the consensus view that HICs will repay some but not all of their
debts. Allowing for a more realistic, lower value of 4 and positive NPV projects can make
profitable buybacks totally impossible.
16Throughoutthe current debt crisis no country has made net transfers of more than five
percent of GNP or twenty-five percent of export revenues over any extended period.
18TABLE 2
DESTINATION OF CAPITAL OUTFLOWS, 1983-87
1983-87 Net Capital Total Private as
Total Outflows to Net Percent
Private Creditors Outflows Of Total
($ millions) (S millions) Outflows
Country
Argentina 6,519 5,992 109
Boiivia 248 97 256
Brazil 13,704 14,258 96
Chile 994 4 N.M.
Colombia (32) (1,124) N.M.
Costa Rica 828 712 116
Cote D'lvoire 1,650 11105 1 49
Ecuador 943 330 286
Jamaica 309 115 269
Mexico 23,745 22,842 1 04
Morocco 717 (396) N.M.
Nigeria 3,609 2,726 132
Peru (1,248) (1,876) N.M.
Ptiliilpines 829 37 N.M.
Uruguay 508 502 101
Venezuela 10,253 10,524 97
Yugoslavia 2,531 4,419 57
Year 17 HiCs
1983 2,861 175 N.M.
1984 10,950 8,324 132
1985 18,670 18,037 104
1986 19,428 18,574 105
1987 14.198 15,159 94
1983-87 66,107 60,269 110
N.M. stands for not meaningful.
Source: World Debt Tables, 1988-89 edition.
Note: Private debt accounts for roughly 75 percent of the book value of HIC debt.
19What is the difference between the general case and the special case of section IV?
First, the general analysis allows the "tax rate" on investment to be increasing in
income. A rising marginal tax rate raises the value of marginal debt relative to average
debt and makes profitable buybacks theoretically feasible.
Second, in the general case we are allowing for new investment which is "less risky"
than old. The bound in (22) assumes that marginal investment returns are completely
uncorrelated with inframarginal returns, as in the case of a riskless asset. In this case,
marginal investment returns are more concentrated in defaulting states of nature than are
average investment returns. The bound in (21) goes further, allowing new investment to be
so highly negatively correlated with old investment that the new investment yields positive
returns only when 9 is less than 9.
VI. Risk Aversion
How does our analysis differ when the country is risk averse?Buybacks provide no
returns to debtors in defaulting states, and may yield less than investment for the highest
values of 9. However, buybacks may have higher cx post returns in some intermediate
non.defaulting states. (This is necessarily the case when buybacks and investment yield
the same expected returns.) Therefore the effects of risk aversion are ambiguous. Clearly,
however, if the country's utility function is sufficiently concave, then risk aversion works
against buybacks.
Note that for buybacks to have at least as large an expected return as investment,
marginal investment returns must be skewed towards bad states of nature, andthere must
be rising marginal tax (seizure) rates. Both of these factors make investment relatively more
attractive with risk aversion. For example, when marginal tax rates are either constant or
increasing, holding riskless cash reserves becomes unambiguously more attractive relative
to buybacks in the presence of risk aversion.
17Itis plausible to treat the country as risk averse and foreign investors as risk neutral,
if the 9 shock is diversifiable in world capital markets.
20VII. Seniority
Some recent plans for resolving the HICs' debt problems involve creating new classes
of senior debt to enhance buybacks. A number of Mexico's recent efforts have included
ingenious schemes for doing just that.'8 Stripped of their fancy financial engineering gim-
mickry, such deals are the equivalent of this: For every dollar of old equal priority debt, each
bondholder is given Sc of "senior" debt and $1 —aof "junior" debt. After the exchange,
each investor owns a claim worth exactly as much as what they held before the exchange.
However, the junior debt has a lower market value than the senior debt. Thus, after the
exchange, the country can repurchase junior debt at a lower price than it would have had
to pay for equal priority debt prior to the exchange. Since the country doesn't care whether
the debt it retires is junior or senior, its payments being a function only of the amount of
debtoutstandingand not the distribution of seniority rights among creditors, this type of
scheme would appear to improve the scope for buybacks.
However, as the Mexico case has shown it is not easy to institute strong, credible
seniority provisions for sovereign debt. As the corporate finance literature shows, without
minimum collateral requirements it is difficult to have meaningful seniority clauses; if a
"junior debt" payment is due when money is available but before a "senior debt" payment
must be met, the junior debt really gets priority. However, the very essence of sovereign
debt is that there is no collateral. The seniority issue is very complex theoretically. In
practice, most sovereign debt with the exception of trade credits is treated as equal priority.
VIII. Corporate vs. Sovereign Debt
The analysis above can be thought of as a general model of buybacks. One special
case worth mentioning is the "corporate" case, where one can think of C as dividends pail
and where c(I,9,C) =y(I,O).That is, creditors get all assets in the event of default.
This is essentially the case of q == 1in sections P1—V. Baybacks of equal priority debt
help bondholders if they replace riskless marginal investments, but hurt bondholders if they
replace investments with risk characteristics similar to the corporation's other investments.
However, if debt is finely enough graded by seniority then it can be shown that a repurchase
of the most junior debt is, from bondholders' perspective, equivalent to the debtor's throwing 'SeeBulow and Rogoff (1988).
21its money out —orpaying a dividend. 19Sucha buyback would always be preferable for
the borrower to a zero net present value investment.
IX. Why Do Countries Sometimes Buy Back Debt?
The main conclusion of our analysis is that if highly indebted countries have positive
NPV investment projects, then they will not benefit from expending scarce resources on
debt repurchases. Why then do HICs sometimes conduct such repurchases?
20Sometimes,
the buybacks are part of larger deals in which the country is given a sidepayment by its
creditors. (The analysis here may be useful in evaluating how large these sidepayments need
to be for the country to at least break even.) In other cases, the reason for a buyback may
be that the country's best alternative investment project has negative net present value (in
contrast to our maintained assumption). If alternative investment projects are poor enough,
then it does not matter what percentage of their returns accrue to the country; buybacks
are a more efficient use of its resources.
For some countries, this explanation is quite plausible. Many HICs are now faced with
much higher world interest rates and lower export prices than during the seventies when
they accumulated their debt. As Table 3 indicates, those who have held private investments
in HICs have not prospered in the 1980s. Furthermore, the low current ratio of price to book
value for the HICs' "submerging markets" relative to other markets implies that investment
opportunities, holding political constraints constant, may be generally better elsewhere in
the world. Finally, the fact that so little of the capital flight money that was removed in
the late lOs and early 80s has returned implies that investors who know thesemarkets well
and have money have chosen not to invest. Of course, the assumption that countries' best
alternative investment projects have negative NPV runs completely counter to the debt
overhang theory which says that the countries have many high NFV projects available.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Our analysis does assume symmetric information. Buybacks might make sense if the
19Wereit possible to have a sufficiently comprehensive indexation and seniority structure
(that is, if there were no enforcement problems), then restructurings of the country's debt
would not even have distributional effects. See }'ama and Miller (1972) for the original
discussion of "me-first" rules in the context of corporate finance; see also Fama (1978).
20
Repurchaseswere used extensively during the late 1930s and early 1940s, in the after-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 debtor country's leaders have private information that its future output is going to be much
higher than creditors expect. On the other hand, such experts such as Rudiger Dornbusch
(1988) have suggested that if countries wait a few more years they may be able to repurchase
their debt even more cheaply. As table 4 shows, at least for the last two years the Dornbusch
strategy has been the right one.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Another explanation for buybacks is that politically powerful special interest groups
may benefit from certain debt-equity swap programs even though the country as awhole
loses. For example, Brazil's foreign minister, Mailson de Nobrega, had to combat enormous
pressure from major industrialists when he recently decided to veto a proposed debt-for-
exports plan. 21
Finally, an interesting alternative explanation for buybacks has recently been formalized
by Rotemberg (1988). In his analysis, the deadweight costs to bargaining are lower the lower
the size of the debt; thus there are efficiency gains to buybacks other than the investment
incentives we have focussed on here. We note, however, that the typical LDC debt contract
prohibits buybacks at discount and that debtor countries must negotiate for this right.
When one takes into account the costs involved in bargaining over the size and terms of the
buyback, there may not be any efficiency gain. Furthermore, because many debt reduction
schemes, such as the Mexican buyback of early 1988, involve the creation of new classes of
creditors with interests that conflict with those of both the countries and older creditors, it
is likely that many proposed plans will actually increase future bargaining costs.22 These
issues merit further attention.
X. Conclusion
We have shown, in a reasonably general model, that if a highly indebted country has
good investment projects available to it, then it will not benefit from using any of its
resources to buy back debt at market prices. Debt buybacks and debt-equity swaps only
make sense for the country if these programs are heavily subsidized by creditors. This result
21 See Alan Riding, "Debt-for-Equity Swaps Draw Latin Criticisms", New York Times,
January 2, 1989, p.34.
22 For a favorable analysis of the Mexican buyback, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Mexico Plan a
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 holds for all buyback programs large and small, so long as they involve voluntary creditor
participation and are not part of a larger deal including offsetting concessions from lenders.
The intuition of our result can be broken into three parts. First, if a corporate debtor
has a choice between a zero net present value investment and a debt buyback, creditors
will generally gain (and since there are no efficiency consequences, debtors will lose) from
a repurchase because it gives the firm a lower debt-equity ratio. Second, if positive net
present value projects are available then a buyback is an inefficient use of resources and
even less attractive. Thus, "debt overhang", cited by many as a justification for buybacks,
actually makes buybacks less attractive. Third, when a corporation repurchases debt it
uses funds that would otherwise serve as collateral for creditors. When a country makes a
repurchase, only a fraction of the resources would be expropriable by creditors in the event
of default. Therefore, creditors gain more (and debtors less) from a sovereign buyback than
from a corporate buyback.
Even if one assumes that the only alternative to a buyback for a country is to hold
reserves —acircumstance in which a corporation would always prefer a market repurchase of
risky debt —buybacksonly make sense if creditors can sieze a large fraction of the country's
income when a default occurs. But this seems at odds with the HICs' tendency to default
when their debt grows to more than several months' income. Barring information asymme-
tries, unilateral buybacks make sense for a country only when its alternative investments
are extremely poor.
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where we have made use of the relationships
















Dividing through by qg(I) gives
gC [1 — +f°9f(9)d9 —ft [o
—D—B(X)—qiC
]
f(O)dO 92g(I) q2 c(I)
g1c + 1— if—D-B(X)—q,C1
(A.3)
f(9)dO q2g(I) 929(1)j
g,C ri —F(ã)]+ fef(o)do q,g(!)1 (A.4) +1 929(J)
I
cf Of(9)dO (A.5)
Therefore, ow/ar> fof(o)do> OW/OX. But if OW/OI> OW/OX then X =0.
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